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This paper advances the discussion on which emotion information affects word
accessing. Emotion information, which is formed as a result of repeated experiences, is
primary and necessary in learning and representing word meanings. Previous findings
suggested that valence (i.e., positive or negative) denoted by words can be automatically
activated and plays a role in many significant cognitive processes. However, there has
been a lack of discussion about whether discrete emotion information (i.e., happiness,
anger, sadness, and fear) is also involved in these processes. According to the
hierarchy model, emotions are considered organized within an abstract-to-concrete
hierarchy, in which emotion prototypes are organized following affective valence. By
controlling different congruencies of emotion relations (i.e., matches or mismatches
between valences and prototypes of emotion), the present study showed both an
evaluative congruency effect (Experiment 1) and a discrete emotional congruency effect
(Experiment 2). These findings indicate that not only affective valences but also discrete
emotions can be activated under the present priming lexical decision task. However,
the present findings also suggest that discrete emotions might be activated at the
later priming stage as compared to valences. The present work provides evidence that
information about discrete emotion could be involved in word processing. This might be
a result of subjects’ embodied experiences.
Keywords: affective valence, discrete emotion, prototypical emotion, congruency effect, embodied cognition
INTRODUCTION
Relatively enduring beliefs and predispositions toward specific objects or persons are called
attitudes (Scherer, 2005). Automatic attitude activation is considered to be a mediating mechanism
that plays a role in many significant cognitive processes (Fazio, 2001). In a series of priming studies
(Klauer, 1997; Wentura, 1999; Hermans et al., 2001; Herring et al., 2013), significant emotion
priming effects were demonstrated using prime-target pairs for which the emotional relation was
manipulated, and the influence of affective valence, one of the components of attitudes consisting
mostly of differential valence (Scherer, 2005), was most discussed. The evaluation associated with
a prime appears to be suppressed when the target’s valence is incongruent with primes (Wentura,
1999). To date, researchers reasoned that presentation of an attitude object automatically activates
from memory the valence that an individual associates with the object (Fazio, 2001).
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Using the concept of affective valence, emotional priming
effects were always discussed in a bipolar fashion: positive
and negative. Namely, in most studies, a positive or negative
prime stimulus (word or picture) was followed by a positive or
negative target stimulus. Results showed that the reaction time
was significantly shorter when prime and target shared the same
valence (i.e., congruent condition: positive–positive or negative–
negative) as compared to trials on which prime and target were of
opposite valence (i.e., incongruent condition: positive–negative
or negative–positive). Therefore, presentation of “cockroach” as
the prime, the attitude toward which is evaluated negatively by
an individual, appears to facilitate the activation of the negative
evaluation of the target (e.g., disgusting, see Fazio, 2001).
Moreover, Kousta et al. (2009) found an abstractness effect
in which words referring to positive or negative emotions
are processed faster than neutral words, and words that have
more emotional valence trigger a stronger residual latency
advantage compared to those that do not, when variables such as
imageability (a construct derived from dual coding theory) and
rated context availability are held constant (Kousta et al., 2011).
According to these findings, Kousta et al. (2011) proposed an
embodied abstract semantics hypothesis, in which experiential
information is considered as one of the two major types of
information during word learning. The other type is language-
based information (Vigliocco et al., 2009).
It seems that most of the above studies were arranged
under the dimensional emotion framework. Beginning with
Nowlis, most psychologists have described affect as a set of
dimensions (see Russell, 1980 as review). In a valence-arousal
circumplex model, these affective dimensions are considered to
be interrelated in a highly systematic fashion. Interrelationships
among affective concepts can be represented by a spatial model,
in which valence (pleasantness or hedonic value) and arousal
(bodily activation) are the two essential qualities (Russell, 1980;
Izard, 1992; Reisenzein, 1994; Reisenzein and Spielhofer, 1994;
Posner et al., 2005; Madrid and Patterson, 2014). However, the
role of emotion information, one type of experiential information
from our experience of our own inner states, is considered to
be foundational (i.e., primary and necessary) in learning and
representing meanings (Vigliocco et al., 2009). Words that denote
emotional states, moods or feelings provide a crucial example of
how a word may refer to an entity, even if it is not observable
but resides within the organism, so that semantic representations
can be developed. For example, a nurse is someone who offers
help, and the word nurse should be more positive than words like
thief, killer, or robber, etc. However, the nurse could be also a word
denoting negative emotion, because a nurse offers injection and
piles in our own experience. The fact that a nurse offers injection
and piles could be learned as the crucial example of the word
nurse. Then what kinds of embodied information about emotion
can be acquired? In other words, is it appropriate to discuss
emotional priming simply in a bipolar way? This is a question
related to the issue of how people label, or make embodied
statements about, their affective states.
Some researchers have claimed that this valence-arousal
circumplex should be extended to a discrete framework, in which
different numbers of basic/discrete emotion labels should be
defined. That is, different from the modern dimensional theory
(i.e., valence-arousal circumplex model), according to which
feelings are described by the valence and arousal dimensional
space, discrete emotion theory focuses on the original expressions
describing clearly separable states (Scherer, 2005). According to
this theory, most of the basic/discrete emotions play an important
role in adapting to frequently occurring and prototypically
patterned types of significant events in the life of organisms
(Barrett, 1998; Scherer, 2005). For example, during emotional
experience (i.e., “How do I feel?”) and emotion perception
(e.g., “Is my baby afraid?” “Is my mother angry?” “Is my cat
sad?”), both of which are related to the emotion knowledge
that has been learned via prior experience, representations of
internal sensations from the body and external sensations from
the world become meaningful (Barrett, 2006; Niedenthal, 2007).
Experience has also been argued to play an important role in
developing concepts (Glenberg, 1997; Barsalou, 1999; Murphy,
2002; Zwaan, 2003; Barsalou et al., 2008), and the embodied
simulation account is considered to be viable for understanding
the processing and storing of emotional knowledge (Niedenthal
et al., 2009). Therefore, the words “happiness,” “fear,” “sadness,”
“anger,” “surprise,” and “interest” function as categorizing labels
of emotion concepts that are related to the on-going activity that
is realized in the brain (Barrett, 2006, 2009b; Barrett et al., 2009).
Therefore, discrete labels, such as joy, anger, sadness and fear,
were defined as prototypical emotions in the literature (Shaver
et al., 1987; Scherer, 2005).
According to the above argument, one hypothesis can be
made: all negatively evaluated emotions should not be the same,
and the emotional priming effects should be more meticulously
discussed. For example, both the feelings about “defeat” and
“war” can activate the emotions of negative valence, but the
former feeling should be sadness, whereas the latter one should be
fear. As a consequence, it is plausible that both “sadness-war” and
“fear-defeat” are emotionally congruent under the dimensional
emotion view (positive–negative view), but incongruent under
the discrete emotion view (“Sadness-defeat” and “fear-war” are
emotionally congruent under both of the dimensional and the
discrete emotion views.) Should the emotional priming effect be
discussed under a different theoretical framework? We believed
that the theoretical framework based only on the emotional
valence dimension should be complemented with the more
detailed analysis of discrete emotions when discussing emotional
priming.
In the current study, emotional congruency effects were
discussed under the discrete emotion view. That is, according to
the discrete emotion view, though prime and target were both
evaluated as words demoting negative emotions, they might be
still considered to be incongruent emotions because they belong
to different emotion categories. For example, in the current study
one focus was anger and fear, which are both labels (or concepts)
of negative valence. A key assumption was that when both are
followed by a target (event word) denoting negative experience,
there would be a significantly shorter reaction time when prime
and target shared the same prototypical emotion (i.e., anger as a
prime and a target word relating to experience of anger, or fear
as a prime and a target word relating to experience of fear) as
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compared to trials on which prime and target are of different
prototypical emotion (i.e., fear as a prime and target word relating
to experience of anger, or anger as a prime and target word
relating to experience of fear). However, this possibility has not
yet been discussed. Therefore, the primary purpose of the present
experiments was to provide evidence that besides emotional
valence, discrete emotion also triggers congruent effects. To fulfill
this goal, we arranged two priming lexical decision tasks (LDTs),
in one of which (Experiment 1) emotional congruency was
manipulated based on emotional valence, whereas in the other
of which (Experiment 2) emotional congruency was manipulated
based on prototypical emotions.
In addition, we also investigated whether it is the label or
the experience/concept of discrete emotion that triggers the
congruent effects. On the one hand, emotion labels serve to
glue the various instances together into the single category of
one emotion, even if they look very different from one another
(Barrett, 2009b). In other words, emotion labels facilitate the
learning of emotion categories. On the other hand, even trivial
events (i.e., “seeing a cockroach”) can trigger distinct emotional
feelings (Philippot et al., 2003), and the names of these events
(i.e., “cockroach”) can then trigger the specific emotion (Fazio,
2001), because they might evoke memories of past experiences.
However, discrete emotion information evoked by the name of
events (i.e., “event words” in short) might not be as clear as
those evoked by the label of the emotion. For investigating this
statement, either the label of the emotion or event words were
manipulated as the prime in the present study.
Though both valence and arousal are important qualities of
affect (Barrett, 1998), dimensional labels and discrete labels are
believed to be organized at different levels. Shaver et al. (1987)
held that interrelated emotion categories are organized within
an abstract-to-concrete hierarchy. Namely, the affective words
are hierarchically organized first as reflecting their dimensional
portrayal (i.e., positive and negative) and then as reflecting their
discrete portrayal (e.g., prototypical emotions such as joy, anger,
sadness and fear). Moreover, members of these prototypical
emotions are stored at subordinate levels (e.g., amusement and
pride are subordinate-level emotions of joy; Shaver et al., 1987).
Therefore, information from prototypical emotions might not
be as strongly and quickly activated as affective valence. For
testing this issue, stimulus onset asynchrony (SOAs; i.e., the
interval between the onset of the prime and the onset of the
target) was also manipulated in the present study. Researchers
have paid great attention to evaluative priming effects under
different SOAs, which is considered as a tool to provide insight to
the time course of the activation processes underlying automatic
affect/attitude activation. In a series of studies (Hermans et al.,
1994, 2001; Hu, 2012), automatic evaluative processing has been
evaluated under different SOAs (e.g., −150, 0, 50, 100, 150, 200,
300, 400, 1000 ms, etc.). It has been proposed that the process
of automatic stimulus valence occurs at a very early stage in
information processing, and researchers believe that the basic
process is fast, efficient, and outside awareness (Hermans et al.,
2001).
Using the sandwich masks technique, Hu (2012) reported a
converse emotional congruent effect under short SOAs (i.e., 50,
100 ms), and the significant priming effect was reported under
150 ms. A comparison of short and long SOAs showed that
affective priming effects were observed at an SOA of 300 ms,
but not at a longer SOA of 1000 ms (Hermans et al., 1994;
De Houwer et al., 1998); the conclusion was that a SOA of
300 ms is long enough to activate the associated evaluation so that
responding to evaluative congruent targets was facilitated while
responding to incongruent targets was inhibited (Hermans et al.,
2001). According to the recent literature, especially a report using
materials in Chinese (Hu, 2012), SOAs of 50, 150, 200, and 400 ms
were selected.
Before the main study, the most important thing was to
select the appropriate prototypical emotions categories and their
corresponding event words. Some theories state that the ways
people divide the emotional world into discrete categories are
different across cultures, and even vary across individuals, and
over time (Shaver et al., 1987; Barrett, 2006, 2009a,b). However, at
least some researchers have stated that everyone within a culture
shares roughly the same representation of emotion concepts
(see Barrett, 2006 as review). Therefore, we selected prototypical
emotions categories and their corresponding event words based
on the culture of Chinese so that the influence from culture can
be discreetly avoided. In the culture of Chinese, four essential
prototypes (i.e., happiness, anger, sadness, and fear) are mainly
discussed (Zhang, 2008). Some prototypical emotions in western
culture (e.g., “perhaps” is considered as an emotion mentioned
in Shaver et al., 1987 research) are not very distinguished in
Chinese. In addition, in different cultures, numbers of positive
and negative prototypical emotions are not equal (see samples
provided in Barrett, 2006), and apparently, in Chinese there
are no positive discrete emotions at the same intensity as
negative discrete emotions such as sadness, anger, and fear, with
the exception of happiness. More importantly, the influence
of affective valence should be reduced when discussing effects
of prototypical emotions. Four essential prototypes, happiness,
anger, sadness and fear, were selected as materials, but only
negative prototypes were used in Experiment 2.
Though we claimed that choosing only negative discrete
emotions in Experiment 2 was subject to the goal of the present
study, and also to the culture of China, there are still risks
for making just conclusions because people might argue that
the discrete emotion framework could be incomplete without
discussing positive situations. In the literature, there were two
hypotheses regarding different effects from positive and negative
words: according to a negative-privileged view, negative valence
is associated with a general slowdown of the processing of
stimuli; but more recently, valence, regardless of polarity, was
argued to equally facilitate processing due to the relevance of
both negative and positive stimuli (see Kousta et al., 2009 as
review). In addition, even according to the privileged hypothesis,
negatively valenced stimuli invoke stronger behavioral responses
than positive stimuli, even when arousal is held constant (Kousta
et al., 2009). Though it was assumed that there should be discrete
emotional congruency effects in the present study, congruency
effects triggered by discrete emotional words might be not as
significant as those triggered by evaluative emotional words.
Selecting the more strongly activated emotional words (i.e.,
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negative discrete words) should be appropriate for the present
investigation.
Therefore, under the manipulations in the present study,
the main hypotheses are as follow: (1) emotional congruency
effects will be found in both valence priming (Experiment 1) and
discrete emotional (Experiment 2) priming conditions; however,
(2) this effect might occur later (i.e., in longer SOA conditions)
under discrete emotional priming than under valence priming
(i.e., in shorter SOA conditions) when SOAs were used as
indexes, because the discrete emotional information would not
be activated as strongly as valence information in the early stage
of word processing.
PRETEST
The goal of this pretest was to select words denoting different
emotions, which would be used in the following two experiments.
In Experiment 1, affective words and event words denoting
positive and negative emotions were needed, whereas in
Experiment 2, the selected words denoted emotions that were
negative but belonged to different prototypes of emotions.
Therefore, in the present study, happiness was considered to
be the positive prototype, while anger, sadness, and fear were
considered to be the negative prototypes.
Methods
Participants
Ninety university students from the South China Normal
University (40 males, 50 females) participated in the experiment
voluntarily, and were paid after the task.
Materials and Procedures
Four affective words, including happiness, sadness, anger, and
fear, were selected as the cues, and printed in Chinese on A4
paper. Participants were instructed to freely associate and write
down as many as words as possible that they associated with
the cue. The part of speech (e.g., noun, adjective, verb, etc.) and
relation between cues and word productions (e.g., synonymic,
antonymic, etc.) were not restricted.
Results and Analyses
Ninety questionnaires were delivered but an incomplete one
was excluded in the final analyses. Results from the 89 available
questionnaires showed 851 associated words were produced
for Happiness, 833 for Sadness, 959 for Anger, and 828 for
Fear. According to the relation between cues and productions,
associate words were categorized into four groups: (1) synonyms,
such as happiness-delight, (2) antonymic, such as happiness-
sorrow, (3) life events, such as sadness-failure, (4) behavior caused
by the emotion, such as anger-vent, (5) others which could not
be categorized into the previous four groups, such as anger-
birds (a name for a popular game). Numbers and frequencies of
associated words are shown in Table 1, and a list of the most
commonly associated words under each emotional cue is shown
in Table 2.
General chi-square test showed that associated frequency of
life events was much higher than other associations, χ2 = 53.71,
df = 3, p< 0.001, η= 0.14. Further analyses showed that most of
the words were associated with the experience of university life,
including study, relationships, taking exams, love, family, health,
competitions, seeking jobs, ability, and so on, which indicated
that there is a strong mapping between affective and event words.
More importantly, materials presenting event words could be
chosen from associate words produced in the present pretest.
The top 16 associate event words and top 10 synonyms
from each emotion group (i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, and
fear) were selected. All these candidates were Chinese disyllable
words. Because all selected words were relative to university
students’ experience, but not all of them can be equally paired
with word frequencies, familiarity ratings were used instead
of word frequencies to control familiarity of materials in the
present study. Thirty university students who did not participate
in the main study gave five-point familiarity ratings (1 = very
unfamiliar, 5 = very familiar) of all these life events and emotion
primes. Words with an average rating higher than 3.5 were kept
as the final materials (see Appendices A–C).
EXPERIMENT 1
The goals of Experiment 1 were (1) to replicate the emotional
congruent effect in which reaction time was significantly shorter
when the prime and target shared the same valence as compared
to trials on which prime and target were of opposite valence
under four SOAs levels (i.e., 50, 150, 200, 400 ms); and (2) to
compare such a congruent effect under the affective word priming
condition and event word priming condition.
Methods
Participants
One hundred students (27 males, 73 females, ages from 18 to 23,
M = 21.08) from South China Normal University participated
in the present study. They were volunteers and were paid after
participation.
Design
Stimuli in a priming LDT were manipulated in a 2∗2∗4 repeated-
measures factorial design with evaluative congruency (congruent
vs. incongruent) and priming type (affective word vs. event word)
as within group factors, SOAs (50/150/200/400 ms) as a between
group factor, and latencies and error rates as the dependent
variables. Priming (affective word or event word) and probes
(event word) sharing the same affective valence were considered
as the congruent condition, whereas those representing different
affective valence were considered as the incongruent condition.
All participants were divided into four groups randomly, 25
students for each group, and fulfilled only one SOA condition.
Materials
Materials were received from the pretest in which 16 affective
words and 32 event words were selected. Affective words, half
of which were positive whereas half of which were negative,
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TABLE 1 | Descriptions on the frequencies of associated categories from the associated task (N = 89).
Affective words Answer Categories of associated words
Synonyms Antonym Life event Relative behavior Others
Happiness Number 161 11 531 64 84
Frequency (%) 18.92 1.29 62.40 7.52 9.87
Sadness Number 152 2 535 82 62
Frequency (%) 18.24 0.24 64.22 9.84 7.44
Anger Number 89 1 558 193 118
Frequency (%) 9.28 0.10 58.19 20.12 12.30
Fear Number 148 2 550 40 88
Frequency (%) 17.87 0.24 66.42 4.83 10.63
TABLE 2 | Descriptions on the frequencies of first associated words in Experiment 1 (N = 89).
Affective words Answer Categories of associated words
Synonyms Antonym Life event Relative behavior Others
Happiness Number 36 2 42 7 3
Frequency (%) 40.45 2.24 47.19 7.87 3.37
Sadness Number 21 0 47 17 4
Frequency (%) 23.60 0 52.81 19.10 4.49
Anger Number 25 1 45 10 8
Frequency (%) 28.09 1.12 50.56 11.24 8.99
Fear Number 29 0 52 6 1
Frequency (%) 32.58 0 58.43 6.74 1.12
were all used as primes. Event words, 16 of which denoted
positive emotion 16 of which denoted negative emotion, were
used as primes or targets. Therefore, there were eight positive
event primes, eight negative event primes, eight positive event
targets, and eight negative event targets. In addition, another
16 pseudo words were created as the filler probes so that the
number of correct Yes and No responses could be balanced. To
establish congruencies in affective valence between primes and
probes (affective-event or event-event), four types of prime-probe
word pairs were manipulated: (1) affective-event word pairs with
congruent evaluation (e.g., positive: happiness- play games;
negative: sadness- sick), (2) affective-event word pairs
with incongruent evaluation (e.g., joyfulness- quarrel;
feeling bad- being accepted), (3) event-event word pairs with
congruent evaluation (e.g., positive: dating- prizewinning;
negative: love fails- nightmare), (4) event-event word
pairs with incongruent evaluation (e.g., break of relations-
reading; pleased- drunk).
Procedure
A priming LDT without feedback was used. The experimental
software E-Prime presented the stimuli and recorded reaction
times. Control files were constructed to display on the 17 inch
IBM (9512-AB1) monitor (Screen resolution: 1024× 768 Pixels),
and participants were tested individually in a sound-proof room.
Response errors and reaction times, measured from the onset
of words, were automatically recorded by computers for each
participant and each item. A trial consisted of the following
sequence of events: a fixation point (+) was presented for 500 ms
in the center of the screen, then right after the fixation cross
disappeared a priming word was presented for 50, 150, 200, or
400 ms (different SOAs). Probes were presented at the center
of the computer screen right after the offset of the priming and
remained on the screen for maximum 3000 ms.
Participants were asked to judge as quickly and as accurately
as possible whether or not the probe in each trial was a real
word, and to press the corresponding button on a response box.
The inter-trial interval was 500 ms (blank screen) and then the
next trial started. If the participant failed to respond in 3000 ms,
the trial was terminated and the trial was recorded as an error.
Participants received 10 practice trials, for which feedback was
provided. No feedback was provided during the experiment.
Results
Participants’ mean latencies (based on untrimmed correct
responses) and error rates are summarized in Table 3.
Results of the analyses on latency showed a significant
difference between congruent and incongruent priming,
F(1,96) = 24.60, MSE = 250299, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.20, and
between affective word priming and event word priming,
F(1,96) = 52.89, MSE = 544573, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.36. In
addition, a main effect of SOAs was found, F(3,96) = 10.08,
MSE = 140450, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.24. Further LSD tests showed
that shorter latencies were caused by shorter SOAs (50, 150 ms),
rather than by longer ones (200, 400 ms). However, differences
between 50 and 150 ms priming, and between 200 and 400 ms
priming, were not found. The interaction between priming
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TABLE 3 | Means of latencies (ms) and error rates (%) in Experiment 1 (based on evaluative congruency).
SOA
Evaluative congruency Affective word priming Event word priming
50 ms 150 ms 200 ms 400 ms 50 ms 150 ms 200 ms 400 ms
Latencies Congruent 658 ± 94 652 ± 70 728 ± 107 705 ± 92 595 ± 69 613 ± 82 638 ± 97 618 ± 58
Incongruent 684 ± 114 670 ± 93 809 ± 128 797 ± 124 630 ± 99 652 ± 61 696 ± 106 669 ± 80
Error rates Congruent 6.2 ± 7.7 4.0 ± 5.5 1.8 ± 2.8 5.8 ± 10.5 6.2 ± 8.5 4.2 ± 4.5 2.6 ± 4.4 6.0 ± 7.2
Incongruent 8.8 ± 9.2 6.4 ± 6.4 2.2 ± 3.3 6.3 ± 9.6 5.8 ± 7.3 4.8 ± 3.3 2.2 ± 2.9 7.0 ± 10.7
type and congruency did not reach significance, F < 1, ns. In
addition, the interaction between priming type and SOAs, and
the three-way interaction, were missing, Fs < 1, ns.
Results of the analyses on error rates showed that fewer error
rates were produced under the 200 ms priming condition than
the other three SOA conditions, F(3,96) = 9.67, MSE = 0.046,
p< 0.001, η2 = 0.24, but a difference among the latter three SOA
conditions was not found. However, a main effect of emotional
congruency, F(1,96)= 1.22, MSE= 0.008, p> 0.10, and priming
types, F(1,96) < 1, ns, were both missing. In addition, the
interactions did not reach significance, F’s < 1, ns.
Discussion
Experiment 1 was mainly focused on whether in a priming
LDT event words can elicit a similar emotion priming effect as
compared to affective words. As expected, there was a facilitation
in priming LDT when the priming and targets were of congruent
emotional valence (i.e., positive–positive, or negative–negative),
whereas such priming effect was missing when priming and
targets were of incongruent emotional valence (i.e., positive–
negative, or negative–positive), whether affective or event words
were used for priming. These findings are important because
they replicate earlier works on the emotional congruency effect
(Wentura, 1999; Fazio, 2001). More importantly, Experiment 2
builds on these results in that by controlling congruencies in a
discrete emotion level, the discrete emotion view on emotional
effect can be tested.
EXPERIMENT 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test the congruent effect with
discrete emotions as primes to elicit the emotional congruency
effect. Namely, in contrast to the traditional positive–negative
categorization, emotions were divided into discrete categories,
such as happiness, sadness, anger, and fear. The main hypothesis
was that participants would take longer to respond in the priming
LDT when prime and target were of different discrete emotion
categories (e.g., sadness and fear), although, they were of the same
valence (e.g., negative). To avoid an evaluative congruent effect,
only one valence (negative) was chosen in the present experiment.
That is, of the four basic emotions, only happiness is positive
whereas the other three are negative, so materials belonging to
the sadness, anger, and fear categories were selected.
Methods
Participants
Participants in Experiment 1 also took part in Experiment 2.
Design
The design was identical to that of Experiment 1 except
that emotional congruency was defined based on the discrete
emotion. Namely, priming (affective word or event word) and
probes (event word) sharing the same discrete emotion (i.e.,
sadness, fear, anger) were considered as the congruent emotion
category group, whereas, those representing different discrete
emotions were considered as the incongruent emotion category
group.
Materials
Materials were generated in the pretest. To avoid the effects
of positive and negative evaluation, only materials related
to sadness, anger, and fear (but not happiness) were used.
There were 24 affective words and 48 event words. Affective
words, eight of which denoted anger, eight of which denoted
sadness, and the rest of which denoted fear, were all used
as primes. Event words, 16 of which denoted anger 16 of
which denoted sadness, and the rest of which denoted fear,
were used as primes or targets. Therefore, there were eight
angry-event primes, eight sad-event primes, eight fear-event
primes, eight angry-event targets, eight sad-event targets, and
eight fear-event targets. To establish congruencies in emotion
category between primes and probes (affective-event or event-
event), four types of prime-probe word pairs were manipulated:
(1) affective-event word pairs with congruent emotion (e.g.,
sadness: sadness- lose; fear: anxious- writing
thesis; anger: rage- betray), (2) affective-event word
pairs with incongruent emotion (e.g., - ; - ; -
), (3) event-event word pairs with congruent emotion (e.g.,
sadness: defeat- break off relations; fear: death-
working; anger: corruption- naked), (4) event-event
word pairs with incongruent emotion (e.g., - ; - ; -
).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1.
Results
General Analysis
Participants’ mean latencies (based on untrimmed correct
responses) and error rates are summarized in Table 4.
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Affective word priming Event word priming
50 ms 150 ms 200 ms 400 ms 50 ms 150 ms 200 ms 400 ms
Latencies Congruent 616 ± 60 641 ± 75 708 ± 97 696 ± 89 627 ± 61 631 ± 87 658 ± 90 615 ± 51
Incongruent 694 ± 102 672 ± 104 751 ± 106 828 ± 123 615 ± 97 640 ± 62 653 ± 88 690 ± 113
Error rates Congruent 5.6 ± 5.6 2.0 ± 3.8 1.8 ± 2.4 6.0 ± 10.8 6.6 ± 8.3 5.8 ± 7.5 3.0 ± 4.1 5.4 ± 8.0
Incongruent 10.08 ± 7.4 7.0 ± 6.0 1.2 ± 2.2 8.8 ± 13.8 5.6 ± 7.3 5.6 ± 4.8 2.6 ± 3.3 6.5 ± 9.2
Results of the analyses on latency showed a significant
difference between emotional congruent and incongruent
priming, F(1,96) = 17.10, MSE = 194323, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.15, and between affective word priming and event
word priming, F(1,96) = 33.35, MSE = 360408, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.26. In addition, a main effect of SOAs was found,
F(3,96) = 7.22, MSE = 116134, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.18.
Further LSD tests showed that shorter latencies were caused
by shorter SOAs (50, 150 ms), rather than by longer
ones (200, 400 ms). However, differences between 50 and
150 ms priming, and between 200 and 400 ms priming,
were not found. The interaction between priming type and
congruency reached significance, F(1,96) = 5.94, MSE = 72763,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.06. Further simple effect analyses were
used to test specific comparisons that might explain this
interaction. These analyses showed that the congruency effect was
generally significant under the affective word priming condition
(p < 0.001), but not under the event word priming condition
(p > 0.10). In addition, the interaction between priming type
and SOAs was significant, F(3,96) = 3.68, MSE = 39788,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.10, and the interaction between congruency
and SOAs reached significance, as well, F(3,96) = 3.60,
MSE= 40943, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.10. Simple effects analyses on the
priming type∗SOAs interaction showed significant advantages
on emotional words priming occurred only on SOA = 200 ms
(p < 0.05), and SOA = 400 ms (p < 0.05); while simple
effect analyses on the congruency∗ SOAs interaction indicated
that significant emotional congruency effects occurred when
SOA= 400 ms (p< 0.05) rather than other three SOA conditions
(ps > 0.05). However, the three-way interaction was missing,
F < 1, ns.
Results of the analyses on error rates showed that fewer
errors were produced under the 200 ms priming condition than
the other three SOA conditions, F(3,96) = 9.43, MSE = 0.043,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.23, but no difference among the latter
three SOA conditions was found. However, a main effect
of emotional congruency, F(1,96) = 0.82, MSE = 0.005,
p > 0.10, and of priming types, F(1,96) = 0.35, MSE = 0.002,
p > 0.10, were both missing. In addition, no interaction
reached significance [priming type ∗ SOAs: F(3,96) = 1.18,
MSE = 0.006, p > 0.10, emotional congruency ∗ SOAs:
F(3,96)= 0.64, MSE= 0.004, p> 0.10, priming type ∗ emotional
congruency: F(1,96) = 2.21, MSE = 0.013, p > 0.05, emotional
congruency ∗ priming type ∗ SOAs: F(3,96)= 0.60, MSE= 0.003,
p > 0.10].
Further Analysis of Congruency Effect Under Event
Word Priming Across Experiments
In the present study, the main focus was emotional congruency
effects in event word priming conditions. Therefore, latency
data from both experiments under event word priming
were also submitted to 2 (Experiments)∗2 (Priming types)
∗4 (SOAs) repeated-measures ANOVAs. Results showed a
significant difference between congruent and incongruent
priming, F(1,96) = 11.32, MSE = 98538, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.11,
and among SOAs, F(3,96) = 2.60, MSE = 36516, p = 0.05,
η2 = 0.08. However, the difference between experiments did
not reach significance, F < 1, ns. In addition, the interaction
between priming type and experiments reached significance,
F(1,96) = 5.72, MSE = 20401, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.06, and the
three-way interaction was marginally significant, F(3,96) = 2.53,
MSE = 9013, p = 0.06, η2 = 0.07, whereas other interactions
were missing [Experiment∗SOAs: F < 1, ns; Congruency∗SOAs:
F(3,96)= 1.41, MSE= 12277, p > 0.10].
Based on the three-way interaction, further simple effect
analyses were conducted to test differences between congruent
and incongruent event word priming under different SOA
conditions separately (details are in Table 5). Different from
emotional congruency effects occurring at the late SOA stage
(SOA = 400 ms) under discrete emotional priming (Experiment
2), a significant priming effect occurred at the early SOA stage
(SOA = 50 ms) when congruency was defined in terms of
positive–negative emotion (Experiment 1).
Discussion
The novelty of Experiment 2 is that congruency of discrete
emotions (i.e., sadness, anger, and fear), all of which were
of negative valence, appeared to affect performance in the
LDT. However, different from the results of Experiment 1, in
which more dimensional emotion information (i.e., positive vs.
negative) was manipulated, the congruency effect in Experiment
2 occurred only under the SOA level of 400 ms and when primes
were event words. One of the plausible reasons was that affective
information from emotional labels could be more easily activated
than that from event words. However, another more possible
reason was that life events were often displayed with discrete
emotions in everyday expressions. This means that at least a
part of the present priming effect under the emotion priming
condition, which was larger and more stable than the effect
elicited by event priming, was affected by the highly frequent
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 916
fpsyg-07-00916 June 15, 2016 Time: 12:38 # 8
Chen et al. Discrete Emotional Congruent Information Accessing
TABLE 5 | T-test between congruent and incongruent event priming under different SOAs (df = 24).
SOA = 50 ms SOA = 150 ms SOA = 200 ms SOA = 400 ms



















∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05.
collocation. Therefore, the priming effect under the event word
priming condition should be more pronounced than under the
emotion priming condition. The present results indicate that the
experiment triggered a discrete emotional congruent effect at a
later stage (i.e., SOA = 400 ms) as compared to that triggered
by general emotional valence (SOA = 50 ms in Experiment
1). This can be considered as evidence that discrete emotion
information was activated during the accessing of event words,
but this information was much weaker and activated later than in
response to words denoted by positive–negative valence.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study tested whether discrete emotion information
can be activated during word processing. In the literature,
researchers the emotional dimension was mostly characterized
as positive or negative, the emotional congruency effect has
yet to be discussed at the discrete emotion level. In addition,
we focused on whether discrete emotion can elicit congruency
effects as early as the evaluation of emotion. Robust evaluative
congruency effects at the SOA levels of 50, 200, and 400 ms
(Experiment 1), and the discrete emotional congruency effect
at the SOA level of 400 ms (Experiment 2) under the event
word priming condition, indicated that not only general affective
valence but also discrete emotions could be activated under
the present priming LDT. However, discrete emotions were
activated at the later priming stage as compared to general
emotional valences. These findings are important because they
replicate earlier work on the one hand, but also extend that
work by moving from general to discrete emotion. Moreover,
the results provide evidence for the hierarchy model of
emotion.
It is frequently assumed that people spontaneously evaluate
incoming stimuli in terms of bipolar valence, such as pleasant
or unpleasant, liked or disliked, good or bad (Klauer, 1997).
Altarriba et al. (1999) and Altarriba and Bauer (2004) noted
that valence of affective words affects word recognition and
retrieval (Altarriba and Bauer, 2004). This effect can be explained
by the semantic activation model (Altarriba and Bauer, 2004).
However, Kousta et al. (2011) claimed that these findings are
consistent with the embodied theory. Research by Kousta et al.
(2011) showed that abstract words with affective associations
are acquired earlier than are neutral abstract words. Therefore,
contrary to the earlier idea that mappings between word and
world occur during concrete word learning, Vigliocco et al.
(2009) posited a more general explanation. Namely, emotional
states, moods or feelings denoted by words represent a mapping
from the word to the world, and affect word accessing, no matter
which kind (i.e., concrete or abstract) of word it is.
Although, the embodied approaches have been extended to
the representation and processing of the valence of experiences
of word meanings, it has been far less discussed how a
discrete embodied experience could be valid in word accessing.
During emotional development, emotions should not be learned
only dimensionally as positive, negative, and neutral, but also
discretely as happiness, anger, sadness or fear (Shaver et al., 1987).
That is, there should be links between particular appraisals and
particular emotions (Roseman et al., 1990). As a consequence,
it becomes possible that various systematic attempts can be
triggered by different emotions to regain control by shifting
attention to the threat and physiological arousal in preparation
for behavioral responses (Ekman, 2003; Rivers et al., 2007).
Therefore, preparation for behavioral responses to “defeat” and
“war” are different because experiences of “sadness” and “fear”
are different. However, there has been a lack of discussion about
whether emotion information or emotional experience affects our
word learning and accessing at the discrete emotion level.
Results of Experiment 1 provided evidence that different kinds
of words elicited similar emotional congruency effects under the
affective valence condition. Based on these results, which can
be seen as supporting the argument by Vigliocco et al. (2009),
we further investigated a similar effect under the superordinate
level in Experiment 2. Results of Experiment 2 indicated that
discrete emotion also affects word processing. Different from
most of the recent research in which life events were always
categorized as positive and negative (Robinson and Kirkeby,
2005; Robinson and Hippel, 2006), Experiment 2 categorized
words referring to different discrete emotions belong to the three
negative prototypes (namely whether words have sad, angry, or
anxious connotations). We found an advantage for the congruent
condition in comparison to the incongruent condition, in which
congruent emotion facilitation was found when primes and
probes belonged to the same prototypical emotion when all
materials were of negative valence. In other words, specific
prototypical emotion information was accessed in the present
priming LDT.
Moreover, the priming effect was found to be robust and
stable under affective word priming, no matter whether the
emotions were dimensionally or discretely manipulated. This
finding might be the evidence that emotion information was
more easily activated by clear emotion labels. However, it was
not completely clear that such a priming effect elicited by
affective words was completely a congruency effect. Affective-
event word pairs were generated by a word-association test. As
a consequence, the priming effects might have been partially
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triggered by the highly frequent collocation between affective
words and events in everyday expressions. Discrete affective
words and event words in the congruent condition are frequently
used in everyday expressions (e.g., I am angry at his defection,
or I am happy that you passed the exam). A specific emotional
label can semantically activate several candidate events, which
can be regarded as preparation for the upcoming LDT, and
responses for the congruent trails will be quickened as compared
to the incongruent trails. Should the present findings be more
consistent with the language-based view (Vigliocco et al., 2009),
rather than embodied emotion view?
Therefore, results of event word priming, in which the
influence of highly frequent collocation was excluded, are more
convincing for the present discussion. According to the SOA
effect, under event word priming, an emotional congruency
effect was found at the early stage when congruency of
affective valence was manipulated (i.e., positive–negative, in
Experiment 1), but at the late stage when congruency of
discrete emotion was manipuated (i.e., sadness, anger, and
fear, in Experiment 2). Apparently, activation of the discrete
emotion information was not as fast as that of affective
valence.
We believe that the present results are consistent with
the hierarchical view of emotion, which is compatible with
the bipolar view of the emotional congruency effect. Shaver
et al. (1987) proposed a dynamic model of the emotion
process implicit in emotion episodes. According to this model,
emotions are conceptualized as beginning with an interpretation
of events as positive or negative; then, one of the basic
emotions, namely one of the prototypical emotions in the
present study, is elicited, accompanied by characteristic action
tendencies, cognitive biases, and physiological patterns that
also arise automatically. This emotion-related information is
processed every day, and people can comprehend an event in
either a more detailed or more general way. For example, a
detailed description such as “a sad woman” is more cognitively
vivid and imaginable than a description such as “a woman
who is experiencing negative emotion” (Shaver et al., 1987).
Therefore, existence of a discrete emotional congruency effect is
acceptable.
In addition, according to this dynamic model, experience of
emotion could be described under different dimensions: valence
(i.e., positive or negative), potency (i.e., weak or strong), and
activity (i.e., low or high), all of which are forms of experiential
information that would affect word processing. Therefore,
experiential information of a word can be processed evaluatively
(i.e., positive or negative; Fazio, 2001), and the stronger the
feeling is, the faster the process is (i.e., positive/negative vs.
neutral; Kousta et al., 2009). More importantly, as mentioned
in the three-dimensional solution model (Shaver et al., 1987),
anger-related emotions tend to be high in potency, sadness-
related emotions tend to be low in potency, and fear tends to be
intermediate in potency. In other words, results of the present
study indicated that the potency can also affect word processing.
We believed that this feeling of potency comes from subjects’
everyday experience.
CONCLUSION
This study provides evidence that emotion information denoted
by a word can be considered a prominent feature that affects word
accessing, and the results are discussed in terms of the extent to
which discrete emotion information is involved in this process.
Emotion information as a prominent feature appears beneficial
on several levels. Firstly, emotion information is primary and
necessary in learning and representing word meanings (Vigliocco
et al., 2009), and as a result of repeated experiences, emotions
are organized within an abstract-to-concrete hierarchy (Shaver
et al., 1987). Therefore, both the bipolar feature (i.e., positive-to-
negative valences) and the subordinate feature (i.e., prototypical
emotions) affect word accessing. Secondly, activation of emotion
information varies under different levels. Valence of emotion
denoted by words is fast and strongly activated, and then
followed by activation of subordinate emotion information.
Thirdly, affective words elicit larger priming effects than event
words do. This priming effect might be partially triggered
by highly frequent collocation between primes and probes in
everyday expressions, which was not tested in the present
study.
Taken together, the findings suggest that discrete emotion
information produces congruency effects similar to those
triggered by general affective valence. In addition, consistent with
the hierarchical model of emotion, in which emotion information
is organized within an abstract-to-concrete hierarchy, these
discrete emotion effects, as compared to dimensional ones, occur
at the later stage of word processing.
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